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Abstract 
Conventional  in-work  benefits  or  tax  credits  are  now  well  established  as  a  policy 
instrument for increasing labour supply and tackling poverty.  A different sort of in-work 
credit is one where the payments are time-limited, conditional on previous receipt of 
welfare, and, perhaps, not means-tested. Such a design is cheaper, and perhaps better 
targeted, but potentially less effective. Using administrative data, this paper evaluates one 
such policy for lone parents in the UK which was piloted in around one third of the 
country. It finds that the policy did increase flows off welfare and into work, and that 
these positive effects did not diminish after recipients reached the 12 month time-limit 
for receiving the supplement. Most of the impact arose by speeding up welfare off-flows: 
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1.  Introduction and motivation 
In-work  benefits  or  tax  credits  are  now  well  established  as  a  policy  instrument  for 
increasing labour supply and tackling poverty. Much research has been on the experience 
of the EITC in  the US, and the various in-work credits in the UK, both of which have 
been aimed principally at families with children, but a wide range of OECD countries 
have  used  in-work  credits  to  some  extent.  A  typical  in-work  credit  is  available 
indefinitely, and eligibility depends on current income and family status. But there is a 
growing trend, at least in the UK, to use a different sort of in-work credit, where the 
credit is time-limited, conditional on previous receipt of welfare (and with no, or only a 
limited, means-test, although this is a less important design feature). Such policies lie 
somewhere in between conventional in-work credits, and a conventional back-to-work 
bonus (we discuss the relevant literature in Section 2).  
For a given level of generosity, a targeted, time-limited in-work credit is clearly cheaper 
than a conventional in-work credit. By conditioning on previous receipt of welfare, it 
may be better targeted on low-skill, potential-low-wage, individuals than a conventional 
credit (where high-wage individuals can cut their hours worked to become entitled to an 
conventional in-work credit). But, for someone currently on welfare, the encouragement 
to  labour  supply  provided  by  a  time-limited  in-work  credit  may  be  lower  than  a 
permanent credit of the same weekly or monthly generosity.   
This  paper  provides  evidence  on  a  targeted,  time-limited,  in-work  credit  from  Great 
Britain (unhelpfully, the policy was called In-Work Credit, so we use “IWC” to refer to 
the specific policy in the UK, and “in-work credit” to refer to the generic policy).
 2 We 
give more details of the policy and UK policy background in Section 2, but IWC was 
worth £40 a week, and could be received by lone parents who had previously spent at 
least a year on welfare if they moved into work of 16 or more hours a week, but with a 
maximum payment of 52 weeks.  The policy was in operation in about a third of Great 
Britain, starting in different areas at different times. This naturally suggests the use of 
lone parents in areas where IWC was not in operation as a comparison group. The policy 
was made nationwide in April 2008, but the data available to us at the time of writing was 
up  to  April  2007.  Our  evaluation  was  limited  to  administrative  data,  limiting  the 
outcomes  that can  be considered to  whether  lone parents  are receiving  welfare, and 
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whether they are in work (technically: whether their earnings would be liable for income 
tax). The administrative data, described more in Section 3, has no information on hours 
worked, and the information on annual earnings proved not to be usable.
3 In section 3, 
we also provide descriptive data on the take -up of IWC, the sort of lone parents  who 
claimed it, the duration of IWC receipt, and how the labour market behaviour of IWC 
recipients differ from other lone parents who left welfare.  
Section 4 sets out our econometric approach to estimating the additional impact of IWC. 
We use a model of t ransitions on and off welfare and IWC, which can provide a rich 
understanding of the impact of IWC – such as separating its overall impact into that due 
to encouraging exits from welfare to work, and that due to encouraging job retention
4, 
and we compare these results to those from a simple difference-in-differences estimator. 
Both estimates ultimately make use of lone parents in parts of Great Britain where IWC 
was not operating, as a control group.  
The main question, then, is to what extent IWC led to le ss time on welfare, and more 
time in work, amongst those who were potentially eligible for it (lone parents are defined 
as potentially eligible for IWC if they have been receiving welfare for at least 12 months, and 
live  in  an  area  where  IWC  is  being  piloted;  they  would  be  eligible  for  IWC  if  they 
stopped claiming welfare and started a job of at least 16 hours a week).  The overall 
effect of IWC could arise because it encouraged potentially eligible lone parents to leave 
welfare faster, or because it encouraged its recipients to stay in work and off welfare for 
longer (as they would lose eligibility for IWC if they stopped work or re-claimed welfare). 
We provide evidence on this in Section 5. The time-limit naturally raises a follow-up 
question: how did lone parents respond when they reached the 52 week limit of IWC 
payments? We address this descriptively in Section 3, and more thoroughly in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
                                                 
3 The data is known as the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), help by the UK Department for Work and 
Pensions. The estimated impacts of IWC reported in this paper would be too small to be detected reliably using 
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4 Assessing whether IWC reduced the speed at which former welfare recipients re-claim welfare raises selection issues, 
as noted by Ham and LaLonde (1996), and Eberwein, Ham and Lalonde (1997).  
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2.  Detail of the In-Work Credit 
2.1  In-Work Credit, and how it relates to existing welfare and tax credit policy 
for lone parents 
In-Work  Credit  was  available  to  lone  parents  who  had  been  receiving  welfare  for  a 
continuous period of 12 months or more;
5 and stopped claiming welfare and moved into 
work of at least 16 hours per week. It was payable at a rate of £40 per week for up to 12 
months.  Payments stopped after 12 months, or if the lone parent stopped working (very 
short periods out of work were over -looked), or if the lone parent  re-claimed welfare.  
Lone parents had to provide payslips as evidence that they were still in work; employers 
had no other role, and would not normally know whether their employees were receiving 
IWC.  The payments were made weekly in arrears, and were not means -tested, nor 
taxable, nor  did they count as income  for the purpose of other means -tested welfare 
benefits or tax credits. Repeat claims of IWC were allowed, but only if a lone parent 
spent 12 months on welfare to regain potential eligibility.  
The government agency which operates welfare -to-work policies divides Great Britain 
into about 90 districts, and pilots operate at the level of the district  (“Jobcentre Plus 
districts”).  By  2007,  IWC  was  operating  in  about  a  third  of  Great  Britain,  but  this 
reflected a gradual roll-out, with IWC starting in four sets of districts on four different 
start dates: April 2004,  October 2004, April 2005, October 2005.
6 Some of the districts 
were chosen because they had a relatively high number of lone parents claiming welfare, 
or because lone parents on welfare had low off -flow rates, but the extension to all of 
London and the south-east of England was motivated by the fact that the high level of 
rents and council tax (the local tax), and the associated means -tested rebate schemes 
(housing benefit and council tax benefit) led to weak incentives to work for lone parents.  
IWC is by no means the only form of support for lone parents in the UK. Figure 1 
shows the relationship between gross earnings and net income after liability to all direct 
taxes and entitlement to all welfare  payments and tax credits. The figure assumes an 
hourly wage of £5.05 (which was the national minimum wage roughly halfway through 
                                                 
5 We use “welfare” throughout to refer to what are known in the UK as “out-of-work benefits”.  The relevant benefits 
were Income Support, Jobseekers Allowance, Incapacity Benefit, Carer‟s Allowance or Severe Disablement Allowance. 
6 In July 2007, IWC payments were increased to £60 a week in London , and  the policy was introduced into the 
remaining districts in April 2008, but both of these are outside the period covered by our data (which ends in April 
2007).  
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the data covered in this report), and so weekly pre-tax earnings of £80.80 correspond to 
16 hours a week work, which is a key  threshold in the UK‟s tax credit and welfare 
system. The figure shows the relationship with and without IWC for a typical lone parent 
on welfare, with one child, and who lives alone, paying a modest rent.
7 For reference, it 
also shows a 45 degree line whos e intercept is the value of entitlement to all welfare 
benefits if the lone parent has no private income (in other words, it corresponds to a 0% 
participation tax rate). Without IWC, there is already a notch in the budget constraint at 
earnings levels which correspond to 16 hours work a week: at this point, lone parents 
lose entitlement to welfare benefit ( income support), but gain entitlement to (the more 
generous) in-work  tax credits (working tax credit).  IWC  makes this notch  considerably 
larger, and the PTR on low-earnings work falls to close to zero, which Saez (2001) and 
Brewer et al (2008) argue may well be optimal given what we know about lone parents‟ 
responsiveness to financial payoff to work.
8 Another very important point to note is that 
lone parents with low private resources had to fulfil extremely weak conditions in order 
to maintain eligibility for welfare benefits, with no requirement to be working, or even to 
be looking for work, until their youngest children were aged 16. This extremely  – by 
international standards – generous approach to welfare benefits for lone parents must 
help explain why the UK relies so much on in-work payments as a way of encouraging 
lone parents to leave welfare and start work.
9 
IWC is the main focus of this paper, but  in some districts, it was introduced alongside 
other labour market policies also designed to  help lone parents into work, and they are 
detailed in Appendix A. 
                                                 
7 The programme that supports renters in the UK, housing benefit, is an entitlement-based programme, which will 
rebate rents up to locally-determined ceilings. It is also available to those in-work, but it has a very steep withdrawal 
rate. Brewer et al (2008) identify HB as the single-most important benefit in causing weak incentives to work in the 
UK. The vast majority of lone parents on welfare are entitled to HB. 
8 The other welfare benefits and tax credit to which these lone parents might be entitled are as follows: (1)   a 
non-means-tested child benefit, worth £17.45 a week for families with 1 child; (2) a means -tested refundable child tax 
credit, worth £44.42 a week for families with 1 child and an income under £14,155 (and withdrawn at 37% after that); 
(3) at most one of the following: a means-tested refundable working tax credit, worth up to £63.55 but conditional on 
working 16 or more hours a week, and withdrawn at 37% for annual earnings above £5,220; a means -tested welfare 
benefit (income support), worth £57.45 a week, but conditional on working less than 16 hours a week, withdrawn at 
100% after a weekly earnings disregard of £15; (4)  Housing benefit and council tax benefit (a benefit which offsets 
liability to the local tax in the UK, which is known as council tax), whose generosity depend upon the rent and council 
tax liabilities, and which are both withdrawn steeply once entitlement to welfare benefits has been fully withdrawn. All 
amounts correct for 2006-7, the last year covered by our data. There is more anal ysis of the financial work incentives 
facing lone parents in the UK in Brewer et al (2007) and Brewer et al (2008). 
9 Welfare benefits for lone parents have since beoame less generous: by 2011, lone parents whose youngest child is 
aged 7 or over will have to look for work and accept reasonable job offers as a condition of receiving welfare benefits.   
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2.2  Previous literature and what might be expected to happen? 
A  considerable  amount  is  known  about  conventional  in-work  credits,  and  how  they 
affect labour supply, particularly for lone parents in English-speaking countries: see, for 
example, Brewer, Francesconi et al (2009) and references therein. Such research tells us 
that lone parents are relatively responsive on the extensive margin, leading some to argue 
that participation tax rates should be set at levels close to zero, or even negative, for such 
groups (Saez, 2001; Brewer et al (2008)). 
Analysis of US welfare reform can clearly provide insights into the impact of time-limits 
(ie  Grogger  and  Karoly,  2005),  but  the  nature  of  the  welfare  experiments  and  their 
inherent incentives are rather different from those produced by IWC: time-limit in the 
US have tended to refer to time-limits on the whole of welfare payments (ie the AFDC 
or TANF programmes) relative to a world where those programmes exist with no time-
limits, rather than a time-limit on an in-work supplement relative to a world with no in-
work supplement.  
The most well-known of the targeted, time-limited in-work credits is the Canadian Self-
Sufficiency Project, a large-scale demonstration project in the 1990s which made use of 
random assignment (Card and Hyslop, 2006, and references therein). The design of IWC 
has some similarities with SSP – both were available only to lone parents who had spent 
at least a year on welfare, and both programmes required lone parents to leave welfare 
and move into work to receive the payments. But SSP was conditional on work of 30 
hours a week, rather than 16, and could be paid for 3 years, rather than 1. But it also had 
some features not found in IWC: first, if lone parents did not move into work within a 
year of being enrolled into the demonstration programme, then they could never receive 
SSP; second, once lone parents had received their first SSP payment, they would receive 
it for each of the next 36 months in which they were in full-time work: in periods out-of-
work, no SSP was paid, but a lone parent did not need to spend 12 months back on 
welfare in order to receive more  SSP payments.  
The other targeted, time-limited in-work credits that have been operated in the UK have 
not been robustly evaluated. 
10 
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Adam et al (2008)), but the evaluation could not isolate the impact of the credit.  
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Card and Hyslop (2005, 2006) set up a simple search model, and analyse how the SSP 
affects incentives and behaviour. The changes in incentives induced by IWC are simpler, 
so the sort of considerations in Card and Hyslop, as well as past evidence from similar 
programmes  suggest  the  following  responses  are  likely  following  the  introduction  of 
IWC: 
i.  IWC  should  make  it  more  likely  that  a  potentially  eligible  lone  parent  in  a  district 
operating IWC leaves welfare and starts a job of at least 16 hours a week.
11 
ii.  Having left welfare for a job, IWC should make it more likely that its recipients stay 
in work of at least 16 hours a week. However, this effect may decline, or cease 
entirely, when the 52-week time-limit of IWC payments is reached. 
iii.  The existence of IWC may induce some lone parents who would otherwise have left 
welfare after less than 12 months to remain on welfare for longer in order to become 
potentially eligible for IWC. Such responses are known as “anticipation effects”. 
12 
(Card and Hyslop (2006) find evidence of such anticipation effects for lone parents in 
Canada  who  were  potentially  eligible  for  the  S elf-Sufficiency  Project  (SSP)  
programme if they remained on welfare for 12 months).   
iv.  A more extreme response is that the existence of IWC may induce some lone parents 
who would not have claimed welfare at all  to claim welfare  in  order  to become 
potentially eligible for IWC. 
Responses (i) to (ii) are investigated in this paper. Some evidence on response (iii) is 
shown in Brewer et al (2009), but it is not possible to investigate response (iv) with the 
data available to us, although this seems a priori an extreme response. 
                                                 
11 Lone parents are defined as potentially eligible for IWC if they have been receiving Income Support (IS) / Jobseeker‟s 
Allowance (JSA) for at least 12 months and live in a Jobcentre Plus (JCP) district where IWC is being piloted; they 
would be eligible for IWC if they stopped claiming welfare, started a job of at least 16 hours per week and were living 
in  a  JCP  district  operating  IWC  at  the  time  (this  concept  of  being  “potentially  eligible”  is  fundamental  to  our 
evaluation). 
12 The benefits from doing this would be up to £2,080 in IWC payments; assuming it is costless to delay leaving 
welfare for a job, the only cost would be the net earnings (i.e. net of taxes paid and  welfare lost) forgone during the 
period of delay.  
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3.  Data, and descriptive analysis 
3.1  Data 
The focus of this paper is on the impact of In Work Credit on those lone parents who 
were potentially eligible for it. We make use of administrative data on spells on welfare 
benefits, payments of IWC, and employment records – known as the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study (WPLS) – augmented with local-area data which we mapped in using 
claimants‟ postcodes (see Appendix B). The data used means we cannot learn about the 
impact of  IWC on the  lone parent  employment  rate nor  on the proportion  of  lone 
parents  claiming  IS/JSA:  in  practice,  the  small  impacts  that  this  paper  estimates 
(discussed in subsequent sections) mean that any impact on the overall employment rate 
amongst lone parents would be very small. 
3.2  Descriptive analysis: who received In Work Credit, and how did their 
labour market behaviour differ from other lone parents on welfare? 
By March 2007, just under 10 per cent of potentially eligible lone parents had received 
IWC: this provides a theoretical upper bound to the additional impact of IWC on the 
proportion of lone parents who leave  welfare or move into work (see  Figure 3.1 in 
Brewer et al (2010)).  Table 1 shows that IWC recipients made up 18–19 per cent of all 
lone-parent welfare leavers, and 27 per cent of all lone parents who leave welfare after 12 
months in the pilot districts.  Lone parents leave welfare for reasons other than moving 
into jobs of at least 16 hours a week, and so this measure of participation should always 
be lower than 100 per cent.
 13  
The majority of IWC recipients (66–67 per cent) claim for at least 11 of the maximum 12 
months,  15–17 per cent claim for between six and 11 months and 16–19 per cent claim 
for less than six months (see Table 2). 
14   Table 3 shows that IWC recipients are slightly 
less likely to be male and are over a year younger, on average, than  other lone parents 
who left welfare but did not receive  IWC); they tend to have fewer children; they have 
                                                 
13 To be genuinely entitled to IWC, a lone parent has to be potentially eligible, and then leave welfare and start a job of 
at least 16 hours per week, so an obvious definition is “Number of new IWC recipients as a percentage of the number 
of potentially eligible lone parents who left welfare and started a job of at least 16 hours a week over some period.”  
However, Brewer et al (2007) showed that the administrative data on work spells is not accurate enough to withstand 
an estimate of IWC take-up on this definition.   
14 We use at least 11 months as a proxy for the full 12 months to allow for measurement error in the start and end 
dates. Brewer et al (2009) shows that using the  total amount of IWC received to infer the length of claim  makes very 
little difference to the results.  
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spent less of the past 21 months on welfare; they are considerably more likely to have 
been on NDLP
15 in the three years prior to leaving  welfare than non-IWC recipients; 
they are  less likely to have  been  recorded as receiving a disability benefit in the 18 
months before leaving  welfare than non-IWC recipients.  Essentially, IWC recipients 
tend to have slightly more of the characteristics that are associated with return to work 
than other lone parents who leave  welfare after at least 12 months in the pilot districts 
(i.e. than other potentially eligible lone parents).  Within  IWC recipients, long-claim IWC 
recipients are slightly less likely to be male than short -claim IWC recipients, are nearly 3 
years older than them on average, are significantly less likely to have a child under the age 
of 3 and significantly more likely to have a child over the age of  7 (Brewer et al (2009), 
Table 3.7). (For  previous research on factors  associated with  lone parents‟ return to 
work, see Yeo (2007), D‟Souza et al (2008) and La Valle et al (2008).)   
We would expect IWC recipients to have different labour market behaviour from other 
lone parents who left welfare, particularly those who left welfare but not for IWC in pilot 
districts. Figure 2 illustrates the proportions of IWC recipients, and other welfare leavers, 
who are in work, from two years before to 30 months after leaving welfare (chapter 3 of 
Brewer et al (2009) shows equivalent Figures for receipt of welfare).  There seems to be 
little change in outcomes for IWC recipients at around the time of the 52 week time-
limit, but not all lone parents receive IWC for the full 52 weeks. Figure 3 explores this 
further by illustrating the welfare and work profiles for IWC recipients split according to 
the  length  of  their  IWC  claim.    The  patterns  of  employment  in  the  months  before 
receving  IWC  are  similar,  but  there  are  clear  differences  thereafter  according  to  the 
length of the IWC claim. Unsurprisingly, lone parents who claimed IWC for at least 11 
months are the most likely to be in work in the 30 months subsequent to claiming IWC: 
two-thirds (66 per cent) of IWC recipients whose claim lasted at least 11 months are in 
work one year after leaving welfare, compared with 35 per cent of IWC recipients whose 
claim lasted between six and 11 months, and 26 per cent of IWC recipients whose claim 
lasted less than six months.  But even after isolating those lone parents who received 
IWC for the full 52 weeks, there is no discernible evidence that lone parents stopped 
work, or re-claimed welfare, when they reached the time-limt for IWC payments. 
                                                 
15 NDLP is a voluntary labour market programme for lone parents. It gives the lone parent more frequent contact with 
a dedicated Personal Advisor, and it gives the Personal Advisor access to a greater range of support, cash grants and 
training opportunities that he or she can use to help the lone parent enter work.   
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4.  Empirical methods 
Ham and Lalonde (1996) considered the impact that a training programme, aimed at 
welfare recipients, had on the participants‟ subsequent spells of employment. They note 
that, even with random assignment of welfare recipients to training programmes, the 
existence of the training programme alters the nature of those in the treatment group 
who go on to employment, meaning that those in the control group who go on to 
employment are not, in general, a valid comparison group. Even with experimental data, 
they argue, non-experimental methods will be needed.  
Our  set-up  is  similar,  but  without  the  random  assignment.  We  are  interested  in  the 
impact that IWC had on inital job entry rates, recipients‟ job durations, and job exits 
and/or flow rates back on to welfare. But IWC will in principle alter the nature of lone 
parents who leave welfare for work, and so lone parents who left welfare for work in our 
comparison group (which in our case refers to lone parents in different districts, having 
accounted for district fixed effects by using pre-programme data) are not a valid control 
group. Accordingly, we follow Ham and Lalonde (1996), and Eberwein et al (1997) to 
estimate a model of transitions on and off welfare, and how these are affected by IWC.  
An ideal model would allow lone parents to be in one of three (exhaustive and mutually-
exclusive) states: 
1.  receiving welfare   
2.  not receiving welfare, and in work for at least 16 hours per week; 
3.  not receiving welfare, and working for fewer than 16 hours per week (including 
not working at all). 
In this ideal model,  there are six transitions, each of  which  could  be modelled as a 
function  of  observable  and  unobservable  characteristics,  as  well  as  being  potentially 
eligible for or receiving IWC.  However, the data available to us was not sufficient to 
estimate this ideal model.  As discussed in Appendix B (and in more detail in Brewer et al 
(2007)), the employment data in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) 
does not provide an accurate guide as to whether a lone parent is in work of 16 or more 
hours per week, with apparent errors in both directions: some lone parents are recorded 
as being in work when this seems to conflict with the out-of-work welfare benefits that 
they are receiving, and some lone parents are not recorded in work when it seems highly  
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likely that they are working for at least 16 hours a week (see also Figure 2 and 3 for an 
example of this).  Adapting a duration model to account for this form of measurement 
error would be complicated.  For this reason, the duration model we estimated does not 
use the employment data in the WPLS, and that means that, for the vast majority of lone 
parents who stop receiving an out-of-work welfare benefit, we cannot tell whether they 
are working, and, if so, for how many hours a week.  However, given the programme 
rules, it is extremely likely that lone parents receiving IWC are working 16 or more hours, 
and we make use of this information, plus an assumption about full take-up of IWC 
amongst those eligible to do so, to estimate our model.  
The model is based on a standard utility-maximising framework in a discrete time setting 
where lone parents move from one state to another at time t if the utility gained from 
doing so is greater than the utility of remaining in the same state.  Let the additional 
utility gained from moving from welfare to work of 16 or more hours at time t be: 
, , , , , (1) ( | )
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and the additional utility from moving from welfare to work of fewer than 16 hours 
(including not working at all) at time t be:  
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where x is a vector of observable characteristics such as number of children and age of 
youngest child (which affect the cost of working and the amount of welfare received out 
of work), θ is an individual random effect and   is an error term.   
If the error terms take independent and identically-distributed (iid) type 1 extreme value 
distributions, we can model the transitions using a multinomial logit model; this means 
that the probability of moving from welfare to work of 16 or more hours is modelled as: 
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and the probability of a lone parent moving from welfare to work of fewer than 16 hours 
(including zero) is: 
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and the probability of remaining on welfare is: 
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However, it is only possible to distinguish between the first two transitions for lone 
parents who are potentially eligible for IWC, and then only if it is assumed that there is 
full take-up of IWC by those who are directly eligible.  In particular, it has to be assumed 
that lone parents who are potentially eligible for IWC and then stop receiving welfare 
move into work of 16 or more hours if and only if they then claim IWC.  For lone 
parents who are not potentially eligible for IWC, the model simply examines transitions 
from receiving an out-of-work welfare benefit to not receiving an out-of-work welfare 
benefit, and it models this transition as the sum of the transition of leaving an out-of-
work welfare benefit for work of 16 or more hours and the probability of leaving an out-
of-work welfare benefit for work of fewer than 16 hours, or the probability of them 
leaving welfare is: 
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For lone parents not on welfare, a similar reasoning leads to the probability of a lone 
parent starting a welfare claim being expressed as: 
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and the probability of them remaining off welfare as: 
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   
The transitions are, in general, allowed to depend upon unobservable characteristics.  In 
our implementation, the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated across 
individuals, but correlated for a given individual over time and between transitions of 
different types.  This models explicitly the process that gives rise to dynamic selection 
bias, and therefore allows its effect to be distinguished from that of a genuine impact of 
IWC.  We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the three equations follow 
the one factor structure:  
13 
*
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where θ
* takes a two mass point discrete distribution and αb,w = 0 and cb,w = 1.   
To allow the model to estimate the impact of IWC, the probability of transiting from 
receiving an out-of-work welfare benefit to work of 16 or more hours a week depends 
upon an indicator for being potentially eligible for IWC, and the probability of transiting 
from work of 16 or more hours a week to receiving an out-of-work welfare benefit 
depends upon an indicator which is equal to 1 for the 4 quarters after a lone parent first 
received IWC. Since potential eligibility for IWC depends upon duration on  welfare, 
calendar time and whether a lone parent is in a pilot district or not, these variables are 
also included as explanatory factors. In principle, then, the impact of being potentially 
eligible for IWC on the transitions into work of 16 or more hours can be identified in 
three ways: 
  from variation in the transition rates between lone parents in pilot and comparison 
districts observed at the same time and with the same duration on welfare; 
  from variation in the transition rates between lone parents in the same district and 
with the same duration on welfare but before and after the introduction of IWC (we 
control for calendar time with a quadratic in the number of quarters elapsed since 
April 2001); 
  from variation in the transition rates among lone parents in the same JCP district 
observed after the introduction of IWC but with different durations on welfare (we 
control for duration on welfare with a quadratic in the number of quarters).   
To estimate the model, we turn the spell-based WPLS data into discrete-time, quarterly 
data (we pretended that outcomes are observed only on the 15
th of the middle month of 
the quarter, thereby ignoring transitions in between these dates). The initial state for 
every lone parent is receiving an out-of-work welfare benefit: we sample all IS and JSA 
claims starting later than 1 April 2001 where the claimant is a lone parent at some point 
during that claim, and right-censor all data on 31 March 2007, allowing for repeated 
claims.  This gives a dataset of over 1.4 million lone parents, from which we take a 5 per 
cent sample, giving us a sample of over 70,000 lone parents and 1.1 million person-
quarter observation points.  Table 4 shows the distribution of the number of transitions 
onto and off welfare made by lone parents during the period we observe them in the full 
population in the WPLS.    
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A small set of the explanatory variables was used: number of children, age of youngest 
child, calendar time, duration in current state and indicators for living in each of the pilot 
phases.  The model assumed that there were no effects of IWC on lone parents who 
were not potentially eligible for it (i.e. that there were no substitution or anticipation 
effects).  The whole model was estimated in Stata using maximum likelihood methods. 
As a check on the duration model, estimates were also produced using a standard linear 
DiD regression.  The equation estimated is: 
   . igt t g gt igt igt y x z u            
t   is a full set of quarterly indicators,  g   is a full set of district effects, and xgt is an 
indicator for being in a district that is operating IWC at that time; zigt is a set of personal 
characteristics, and uigt is an iid error term. The sample is all lone parents in all districts in 
Great Britain not operating other major pilots or demonstration projects affecting lone 
parents whose claim on IS had reached 12 months, and outcomes are measured at 3 
month intervals thereafter. This method provides an estimate of the overall effect of 
IWC on lone parents who are potentially eligible for IWC, but makes no use of which 
lone parents actually received IWC (and, as a result, estimates the “intention to treat”) 
and cannot separate the impact of IWC into its impact on benefit exits/job entries and 
on subsequent benefit claims/job exits. Separate estimates were made of the impact of 
IWC on the two different outcomes (off welfare and in work), and the outcomes at 
different durations d (the time between first becoming potentially eligible for IWC and 
the outcome being measured); more details are given in Brewer et al (2009). 
The DiD, and, to a lesser extent, the estimates from the duration model, rely on the usual 
“common trends” assumption: that differences between the districts operating IWC and 
those not operating IWC can be reflected with a time-invariant constant (contained in 
g  ). Brewer et al (2009) present analysis based on the linear DiD approach to suggest 
that non-time-varying area-effects is an appropriate assumption in the period from 2001 
to  before  IWC  began,  and  show  that  a  placebo  test  using  the  DiD  method  returns 
statistically insignificant estimates of a non-existent policy (implemented a year before the 
actual IWC policy).   
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5.  The impact of IWC on potentially eligible lone parents 
5.1  Coefficients in the duration model  
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimated coefficients, including the impact of being potentially 
eligible for IWC, on the transitions from receiving welfare to work of 16 or more hours, 
from receiving welfare to work of fewer than 16 hours and from not receiving welfare to 
receiving welfare, with and without controls for correlated unobserved heterogeneity.   
The following variables are associated with more frequent transitions from welfare to 
work of 16 or more hours: 
  having fewer dependent children; 
  having older children; 
  being in one of the comparison districts rather than one of the Phase 3 districts. 
The following variables are associated with more frequent transitions from welfare to 
work of fewer than 16 hours: 
  having older children; 
  being in one of the comparison districts rather than a pilot district. 
The  following  variables  are  associated  with  less  frequent  transitions  onto  welfare 
(conditional on having previously stopped a claim of welfare):  
  having more dependent children; 
  having older children; 
  being in one of the Phase 3 or 4 districts rather than one of the comparison districts. 
Being potentially eligible for IWC is estimated to increase transitions into work of 16 or 
more hours, and receiving IWC is estimated to reduce transitions onto welfare.   
The specification of the unobserved heterogeneity allowed there to be two types of lone 
parents, with different propensities to leave welfare for work of 16 or more hours, to 
leave welfare for work of less than 16 hours and to start a welfare claim.  In all three 
models, the fact that the loading factors on the unobserved heterogeneity components 
are  positive  in  all  equations  imply  that,  rather  than  one  of  these  types  being  
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unambiguously more likely to be off welfare at any point in time, instead one of these 
types is more likely to make a transition at any point in time; this is the same as was 
found by similar studies (e.g. Ham and Lalonde, 1996; Zabel et al, 2004, 2006). A model 
with no unobserved heterogeneity is clearly rejected in favour of a model with correlated 
unobserved heterogeneity (the likelihood ratio test for the baseline model has a value of 
778.8).      
5.2  Estimates of the impact of IWC on job entry 
The duration model can then be used to estimate the impact of IWC by simulating how 
outcomes would change in the absence of IWC.  This is done by using the estimated 
coefficients and a set of random draws (corresponding to the error terms) to determine 
whether each transition is simulated to occur.  
16 Figure 4 shows the results of such a 
simulation for all potentially eligible lone parents in the pilot districts, and overlays that 
with the DiD estimates (themselves taken from Table 7). The estimated impact of IWC 
on potentially eligible lone parents in the flow sample based on the duration model 
increases the longer lone parents are potentially eligible, reaching around 2 ppts 12 
months after lone parents first became potentially eligible for  IWC; after 24 months‟ 
exposure, the impact is around 3 ppts. The estimated impacts of IWC derived from the 
duration model are slightly larger than the DiD estimates (it is not possible to estimate 
whether the difference is statistically different from zero, as the two estimates are from 
entirely different models); even so, the differences could exist for a number of reasons: 
  The duration model was estimated on a 5 per cent sample of lone parents (over 
70,000 lone parents, 1,300 of whom received IWC), whereas the DiD analysis used 
all potentially eligible lone parents.  This means that the estimates from the duration 
model are subject to a higher margin of error than those based on a DiD estimator. 
  The DiD analysis controlled for many more explanatory variables than the duration 
model, and so it is possible that part of the simulated impact of  IWC using the 
duration model is capturing the impact of a characteristic that has been omitted from 
the model.   
                                                 
16 The random draws were calibrated so that the set of draws is consistent with the observed behaviour under the 
baseline model. Only 1 draw was used for each transition.   
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  The duration model assumes that the effect of IWC on the probability of starting and 
leaving welfare is the same for the stock and flow samples, and that it is the same for 
all durations of time spent on welfare, but the DiD estimates relax these assumptions 
by running different regressions for the stock (not shown) and flow, and at every 
three-month point after the date on which the lone parent first became potentially 
eligible for IWC.   
Figure 5 shows the result of a similar simulation, but only for IWC recipients in the flow 
sample.  It shows the percentage who are simulated to receive welfare and IWC in each 
quarter relative to when they actually received IWC.  Outcomes are simulated with and 
without the estimated coefficient on the IWC dummy in (1).  The additional impact of 
IWC, then, is the vertical difference between the fraction off welfare, and the fraction 
simulated to be off welfare in the absence of IWC. Just over 40 per cent of lone parents 
in the sample who left welfare for IWC would not have left welfare at that point in time if 
IWC had not been available.  However, the additional impact of IWC on the proportion 
of IWC recipients who are not receiving an out-of-work benefit declines over time to 
reach 28 per cent after 12 months and 19 per cent after two years.  Over the 24 months 
after first receiving IWC, the average impact on welfare outcomes for its recipients is 29 
per cent. In other words, the simulations suggest IWC led to its recipients being 29 per 
cent more likely to be off welfare over the 2 years following their first receipt of IWC. 
There are several reasons for this decline over time. First, some of the 40 per cent of 
IWC recipients who are estimated to have been induced to leave welfare by IWC would 
have left welfare anyway in the absence of IWC, but at a later date. Second, some lone 
parents who leave welfare for IWC later return to welfare.  More subtly, the additional 
lone parents who are induced to leave welfare by IWC return to welfare slightly more 
quickly than those who would have left anyway: 28 per cent of lone parents who are 
induced to leave welfare by the existence of IWC return to welfare before the end of the 
12 months of IWC, compared with 26 per cent of those who would have left welfare in 
any event (it is not possible to tell whether these numbers are statistically significantly 
different from each other).   
Deadweight might be defined as the extent to which a programme fails to alter the 
behaviour of its recipients, or 1 minus the impact amongst its recipients.  Under this 
definition, the estimated deadweight at the moment that lone parents claim IWC is 60 
per cent, but it rises over time, just as the estimated impact of IWC on its recipients falls  
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over time.  After 12 months, 19 per cent of the IWC recipients (some of whom are, by 
this stage, no longer receiving IWC) have returned to welfare, and 54 per cent are not 
receiving welfare but would have been not receiving welfare anyway in the absence of 
IWC, with the remaining 28 per cent representing the additional impact of IWC (because 
they are not receiving welfare but would have been receiving welfare in the absence of 
IWC).  After 24 months, none of the group is receiving IWC.  But 34 per cent are back 
on welfare, and 47 per cent who are not receiving welfare would have left welfare anyway 
in the absence of IWC, and only the remaining 19 per cent are simulated to have had 
their labour market state altered by IWC. 
5.3  Estimates of the impact of IWC on job retention  
The duration model allows the overall additional impact of IWC to be separated into the 
impact of IWC on encouraging more lone parents to leave welfare and the impact of 
IWC on encouraging those lone parents who left welfare for work to stay in work and 
off welfare for longer.  This can be done by performing a simulation where entitlement 
to IWC affects transitions off welfare, but there is no impact on transitions back on to 
welfare;  this  can  be  compared  to  the  baseline  simulation  which  assesses  the  overall 
impact of IWC.  
The results are presented in Figure 6. The dark grey area shows the additional impact of 
IWC on IWC recipients that is due to IWC encouraging more lone parents to leave 
welfare  for  work;  the  light  grey  area  shows  the  additional  impact  of  IWC  on  IWC 
recipients that is due to any retention effects, and the sum of the two areas corresponds 
to the overall impact presented in Figure 5 (in Figure 5, the overall impact is the distance 
between the actual % off benefit, and the simulated % off benefit in the absence of 
IWC). In month 0, the simulations suggest that just over 40 per cent of IWC recipients 
would have left welfare for work at that time, and none of this (by definition) can be due 
to a retention effect: it is all due to IWC encouraging more lone parents to leave welfare 
for work.  Over time, the retention effect grows, but it remains small: the simulations 
suggest  that  the  retention  effect  of  IWC  leads  to  2.6  per  cent  of  IWC  recipients 
remaining  off  welfare  12  months  after  they  first  left  welfare  for  work  (and  claimed 
IWC).
17  But these numbers are much smaller than the overall impact of IWC: out of the 
                                                 
17 These estimates are close to the estimated impact of IWC on job retention derived from a DiD model, which takes 
as a sample all lone parents who leave IS and start a job after at least 12 months on welfare, of 2.2 per cent for welfare 
outcomes (and 1.8 per cent for work outcomes). See Section 8.1 of Brewer et al (2010).  
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estimated impact of IWC on its recipients 12 months after they first received IWC, only 
9 per cent of the impact can be attributed to a retention effect.   
Note  that  the  simulations  also  suggest  that  IWC  are  having  an  effect  on  (former) 
recipients  even  after  IWC  recipients  have  exhausted  the  12-month  payment  period: 
although there is a decline over time in the estimated impact of IWC on recipients, there 
is no discernible fall after 12 months.  Clearly, though, the data does not yet tell us for 
how long the overall effect lasts.
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This result should be seen alongside the  discussion in Section 3 on what happened to 
IWC recipients when their claim of IWC ended.  That showed that, for the majority 
(around seven in ten) of IWC recipients who claimed I WC for the full 12 months, job 
retention remained very high even after IWC payments had finished.  Combining these 
two findings about job retention suggests that job retention is high amongst the majority 
of IWC recipients, although little of this is attributable to IWC. 
The results above have assumed that there are no anticipation effects. Brewer et al (2009) 
reports coefficients from a  model that allows for anticipation effects for those  whose 
duration on welfare is less than 12 months but who would become eligible to IWC later, 
and from a model where the probability of leaving welfare changes in the pilot areas after 
IWC is introduced for all lone parents, for reasons unconnected to IWC: we refer to this 
model as one with  „time-varying area effects‟): loosely speaking, the „time-varying area 
effects‟ is identified from lone parents whose duration on welfare is less than 12 months, 
and the impact of IWC comes from a triple difference, comparing the exit rates of lone 
parents is more than 12 months with those whose duration is less than 12 months, and 
how this changes over time and across districts.   
Anticipation effects are statistically insignificant in both the models with and without 
unobserved  heterogeneity.  Time-varying  area  effects  are  statistically  significant  in  the 
model with unobserved heterogeneity.  Figure 7 shows the result of a simulation for all 
those who start a welfare claim after IWC is introduced in their area and includes results 
from the model variants where we allow for anticipation effects and time-varying area 
effects.    Comparing  the  results  from  the  baseline  model  with  the  models  with 
                                                 
18 Card and Hyslop (2005, 2006) examine whether the impact of the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) in Canada declines 
after it stops being paid to recipients.  For some groups, they find the additional impact of SSP dissipates quickly after 
SSP payments stop (Card and Hyslop, 2005); but for other groups, they find the additional impact persists (Card and 
Hyslop, 2006); the two groups roughly correspond to the stock and flow samples examined in this paper.  
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anticipation effects and time-varying area effects suggests that allowing for anticipation 
effects makes very little difference to the overall results – the anticipation effects are 
small  and  statistically  insignificant  in  both  the  models  with  and  without  unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Allowing for time-varying area effects increases the effect of IWC on the 
proportion of lone parents off welfare by up to 1 percentage point. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
The three main issues posed by this paper are: to what extent IWC led to less time on 
welfare, and more time in work, amongst those who were potentially eligible for it; how 
did lone parents respond when they reached the 52 week limit of IWC payments; and 
were the overall impacts mostly due to faster exits from welfare, or slower returns to 
welfare  from  welfare  leavers.  Our  data  was  not  able  to  tell  us  whether  IWC  led  to 
changes in earnings, nor if it had any impact on the number of lone parents claiming 
welfare or in work overall.  
IWC led to statistically significant improvements in work and welfare outcomes.  For 
example, 12 months after first becoming potentially eligible for IWC, just under a fifth 
(18.2 per cent) of potentially eligible lone parents were no longer receiving an out-of-
work benefit, with 1.6 percentage points (ppts) of that 18.2 per cent attributable to IWC.  
Twelve months after first becoming potentially eligible for IWC, a seventh (14.3 per 
cent) of potentially eligible lone parents were in work according to the WPLS, with IWC 
responsible for 1.0 ppts of this 14.3 per cent.   
The main impact of IWC has been to encourage more lone parents to leave benefit and 
start work than would otherwise have done so; the effect of IWC on reducing the benefit 
re-entry rate of IWC recipients seems to have been very small in comparison.  On the 
other hand, simple data analysis suggests that job retention amongst IWC recipients was 
high:  just  under  70  per  cent  of  lone  parents  who  claimed  IWC  received  it  for  the 
maximum 12 months, and, for those lone parents, there is no discernible changes to key 
labour market outcomes when IWC payments stop, and over 80 per cent are still not 
receiving  an out-of-work  welfare  benefit  one year  after  they  stopped receiving  IWC. 
These findings strongly suggest that there are high levels of job retention for the majority 
of IWC recipients who are able to maintain an IWC claim for the full 12 months, but 
that these are not particularly caused by IWC.    
21 
How do the estimated impacts compare with those of other Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) programmes for lone parents? Cebulla et al (2008) sought to compare 
the findings of a number of evaluations and impact assessments of  UK government 
policies designed to encourage lone parents to work: see especially their Table 1 on pages 
10–11. The headline result in this paper for the flow sample is that, after 12 months of 
being  potentially  eligible  for  IWC,  IWC  led  to  an  additional  XX  ppts  of  potentially 
eligible lone parents being off welfare (i.e. not receiving IS, JSA or Incapacity Benefit).  
After 24 months, the figure was 2.0 ppts.  Cebulla et al calculated the impact of NDLP 
amongst all lone parents on welfare to be 1.7 percentage points after nine months and 
1.4 percentage points after two years.  They also reported that, after 12 months, the 
impact of WFIs was 0.8 per cent for lone parents with youngest children aged over 13 
and  2.0  per  cent  for  lone  parents  with  youngest  children  aged  9–12.    All  three 
programmes therefore seem to have had impacts on the population of lone parents on 
welfare  that  are  similar  in  magnitude  (however,  the  estimated  impacts  of  the  three 
programmes  are  all  for  slightly  different  populations:  our  estimates  are  for  all  lone 
parents whose welfare claim reaches 12 months in the pilot districts, the NDLP estimate 
is for all lone parents on welfare in Great Britain and the WFI estimates are for the stock 
of lone parents on welfare with children of various ages). Dolton et al (2006) estimated 
that NDLP led to its participants being 14 per cent more likely to be off welfare as a 
result over the subsequent 2 years, although a later paper highlighted alternative estimates 
(which were preferred by the same authors) of 5% to 10%. 
19 Our equivalent estimate is 
that the average impact on IWC recipients  over the subsequent 2 years  is 29 per cent.  
Ultimately, of course, an impact assessment alone does not provide sufficient evidence to 
determine whether a policy is cost effective or shoul d be continued: such decisions 
should be based on a full cost –benefit analysis, fully informed by the estimates in this 
impact assessment.   
 
REFERENCES  
Adam, S., Bozio, A., Emmerson, C., Greenberg, D., and Knight, G. (2008) A cost-benefit 
analysis of Pathways to Work for new and repeat incapacity benefits claimants, Department for 
                                                 
19 Tables 4, 6 and 7 of Dolton et al (2008).  
22 
Work  and  Pensions  Research  Report  498,  Leeds:  CDS, 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep498.pdf 
Brewer, M., Browne, J., Crawford, C. and Knight, G. (2007) The lone parent pilots after 12 to 
24  months:  an  impact  assessment  of  In-Work  Credit,  Work  Search  Premium,  Extended  Schools 
Childcare,  Quarterly  Work  Focused  Interviews  and  New  Deal  Plus  for  Lone  Parents,  DWP 
Research  Report  415,  http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-
2008/rrep415.pdf 
Brewer, M., Browne, J., Chowdry, H. and Crawford, C. (2009) The lone parent pilots after 24 
to 36 months: the final assessment of In-Work Credit, Work Search Premium, Extended Schools 
Childcare,  Quarterly  Work  Focused  Interviews  and  New  Deal  Plus  for  Lone  Parents,  DWP 
Research  Report  606,  http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2009-
2010/rrep606.pdf 
Brewer, M., Duncan, A., Shephard, A. and Suárez, M.J. (2006) „Did Working Families‟ 
Tax Credit work? The impact of in-work support on labour supply in Great Britain‟, 
Labour Economics¸ 13, 6, 699–720 
Brewer,  M.,  Francesconi,  M.,  Gregg,  P.  and  Grogger,  J.  (2009),  “Feature:  In-Work 
Benefit Reform In A Cross-National Perspective – Introduction”, Economic Journal, 119, 
F1-F14.  
Brewer, M., Saez, E. and Shephard, A. (2010) “Means-testing and tax rates on earnings”, 
in Dimensions of Tax Design, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Card,  D.  and  Hyslop,  D.R.  (2005)  „Estimating  the  effects  of  a  time-limited  earnings 
subsidy for welfare-leavers‟, Econometrica, 73, 6, 1723–1770 
Card, D. and Hyslop, D.R. (2006) „Dynamic effects of an earnings subsidy for long-term 
welfare recipients: evidence from the SSP applicant experiment‟, NBER Working Paper 
12774 
Card,  D.  and  Sullivan,  D.  G.  (1988),  “Measuring  the  Effect  of  Subsidised  Training 
Programmes on Movements In and Out of Employment”, Econometrica, 56(3), 497-530. 
Cebulla, A. and Flore, G. with Greenberg, D. (2008) The New Deal for Lone Parents, Lone 
Parent Work Focused Interviews and Working Families’ Tax Credit: a review of impacts, DWP  
23 
Research  Report  484,  http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-
2008/rrep484.pdf 
Dolton, P., Azevedo, J. and Smith, J. (2006) The econometric evaluation of the New Deal for 
Lone  Parents,  DWP  Research  Report  356, 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-2006/rrep356.pdf 
Dolton, P., Azevedo, J. and Smith, J. (2008) The impact of the UK New Deal for Lone Parents 
on Benefit Recipt, mimeo, http://client.norc.org/jole/SOLEweb/8275.pdf.   
D‟Souza, J., Conolly, A. and Purdon, S. (2008) Analysis of the choices and constraints questions 
on  the  Families  and  Children  Study,  DWP  Research  Report  481, 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep481.pdf 
Grogger, J.  and Karoly, L. (2005), Welfare Reform: Effects of a Decade of Change, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.  
Ham, J.C. and Lalonde, R.J. (1996) „The effect of sample selection and initial conditions 
in duration models: evidence from experimental data on training‟, Econometrica, 64, 1, 
175–205. 
Heckman,  J.,  Ichimura,  H.  and  Todd,  P.  (1997),  “Matching  as  an  Econometric 
Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 64(4), 605-654.  
Heckman, J., LaLonde, R. and Smith, J. (1999), “The Economics and Econometrics of 
Active Labour Market Programmes” in O. Ashenfelter ansd D. Card (eds), The Handbook 
of Labour Economics.  
Heckman, J. and Smith, J. (1999), “The Pre-Programme Dip and the  Determinants of 
Participation  in  a  Social  Programme:  Implications  for  Simple  Programme  Evaluation 
Strategies”, Economic Journal, 109, 313-348.  
Hosain, M. and Breen, E. (2007) New Deal Plus for Lone Parents qualitative evaluation, DWP 
Research  Report  426,  (http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-
2008/rrep426.pdf) 
Jenkins, S. (2008) Extension of the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents pilot to Scotland and Wales: 
qualitative  evaluation,  DWP  Research  Report  499, 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep499.pdf   
24 
La  Valle,  I.,  Clery,  E.  and  Huerta,  M.C.  (2008)  Maternity  rights  and  mothers’  employment 
decisions, DWP Research Report 496, http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-
2008/rrep496.pdf 
Ray,  K.,  Vegeris, S., Brooks,  S.,  Campbell-Barr, V., Hoggart, L., Mackinnon,  K.  and 
Shutes,  I.  (2007)  The  lone  parents  pilots:  a  qualitative  evaluation  of  Quarterly  Work  Focused 
Interviews (12+), Work Search Premium and In Work Credit, DWP Research Report 423, 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2007-2008/rrep423.pdf 
Wooldridge,  J.  (2007)  „Difference-in-differences  estimation‟,  download  from 
http://www.nber.org/WNE/lect_10_diffindiffs.pdf  
Yeo, A. (2007) „Experience of work and job retention among lone parents: an evidence 
review‟, DWP Working Paper 37. 
Zabel, J. Schwartz, S. and Donald, S. (2004), “An Econometric Analysis of the Impact of 
SSP on Unemployment and Employment Durations”, SRDC WP 04-05. 
Zabel, J. Schwartz, S. and Donald, S. (2006), “An Analysis of the Impact of SSP on 
Wages”, SRDC WP 06-07. 
    
25 
Tables 
Table 1 Summary of the destinations of lone-parent welfare leavers 
  Comparison 
districts 
Pilot districts 
    IWC claim 
length defined 






Leave welfare after claiming for at least 12 
months,  
of which: 
201,761  66,523  65,937 
(63.0%)  (68.3%)  (68.1%) 
  IWC recipients    18,284  17,698 
  (18.8%)  (18.3%) 
           
  Leave welfare after 12 months but not for IWC    48,239  48,239 
  (49.5%)  (49.8%) 
Leave welfare after claiming for less than 12 
months 
118,583  30,903  30,903 
(37.0%)  (31.7%)  (31.9%) 
Total  320,344  97,426  96,840 
Note: Sample is all lone parents who left welfare between the introduction of the pilots and 31 March 
2006.   
Table 2 Length of IWC claim, by phase 
  All phases 
  IWC claim length defined using spell start 
and end dates 
At least 11 months  13,609 
(67.2%) 
 
6–11 months  3,397 
(16.8%) 
Less than 6 months  3,238 
(16.0%) 
Total  20,244 
  IWC claim length defined using total 
amount paid to recipients 
At least 11 months  12,841 
  (65.6%) 
 
6–11 months  2,948 
  (15.1%) 
 
Less than 6 months  3,794 
  (19.4%) 
 
Total  19,583 
Note: Sample is all lone-parent welfare claimants in pilot districts with an IWC claim starting on or before 
31 March 2006.   
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Table 3 Characteristics of IWC recipients vs. non-IWC recipients 





Percentage male  4.1  7.8  –3.7** 
Average age   33.5  35.1  –1.7** 
Average age of youngest child  7.3  7.8  –0.6** 
Percentage with youngest child aged 0 to 3  21.0  24.8  –3.8** 
Percentage with youngest child aged 3 to 7  33.0  27.4  5.7** 
Percentage with youngest child aged 7 to 11  21.7  17.0  4.7** 
Percentage with youngest child aged 11 plus  24.3  30.8  –6.5** 
Percentage with one child  53.9  51.6  2.3** 
Percentage with two children  32.3  30.1  2.2** 
Percentage with three children  10.7  12.1  –1.4** 
Percentage with four children  3.1  6.2  –3.1** 
Percentage of 30 months prior to welfare leave 
date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent in work 
8.8  8.8  0.0 
Percentage of months 13 to 21 prior to welfare 
leave date (31 March 2006 for stayers) spent off 
welfare 
20.0  16.6  3.4** 
Percentage ever been on NDLP in the 18 months 
prior to welfare leave date (31 March 2006 for 
stayers) 
84.2  28.6  55.7** 
Percentage ever been disabled in the 18 months 
prior to welfare leave date (31 March 2006 for 
stayers) 
6.8  14.2  –7.4** 
Average claimant count in local area in 2003–04  2.8  2.9  –0.1** 
Average job density in local area in 2004  88.1  89.1  –0.9** 
Sample size  18,284  48,239   
Notes: Sample is all lone parents in pilot districts whose welfare claim lasted at least 12 months and who 
left welfare between when the pilots were introduced and 31 March 2006.  * indicates significance at the 5 
per cent level; ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table 4 Transitions onto and off welfare by lone parents 
Number of transitions  Number  Proportion 
Zero  151,061  10.4 
One  929,339  64.1 
Two  29,892  2.1 
Three  257,549  17.8 
Four   5,026  0.3 
Five   61,350  4.2 
Six or more (even)  857  0.1 
Seven or more (odd)  15,221  1.0 
All  1,450,295  100.0% 
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding.  Base is all welfare claims starting on 
or after 1 April 2001 where the claimant was a lone parent at some point during the claim.    
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Table 5 Coefficient estimates for the transition from receiving welfare to 
work of 16 or more hours and the transition from receiving welfare to 
work of fewer than 16 hours: baseline model 
  No unobserved heterogeneity  Correlated unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Dependent variable:   Stops 
receiving 
welfare for 
work of 16 or 
more hours 
Stops receiving 
welfare for work 











work of fewer 
than 16 hours 
(including not 
working) 
Constant  –4.327  –2.624  N/A  –0.009 
  (32.48)***  (103.40)***    (0.02) 
Potentially eligible for IWC  0.490  N/A  0.528  N/A 
  (4.74)***    (4.49)***   
Number of children  –0.110  0.008  –0.121  0.003 
  (5.00)***  (1.28)  (4.86)***  (0.41) 
Youngest child aged < 1  –0.920  –0.500  –1.048  –0.507 
  (5.70)***  (20.84)***  (5.93)***  (21.77)*** 
Youngest child aged 1–3  –0.219  –0.407  –0.262  –0.429 
  (2.97)***  (19.67)***  (3.30)***  (20.46)*** 
Youngest child aged 3–5  –0.137  –0.253  –0.197  –0.272 
  (1.72)*  (11.31)***  (2.24)**  (12.16)*** 
Youngest child aged 5–11  –0.036  –0.293  –0.052  –0.301 
  (0.52)  (15.19)***  (0.70)  (15.16)*** 
Time trend  –0.183  0.058  –0.186  0.045 
  (9.12)***  (6.20)***  (8.24)***  (4.05)*** 
Time2  0.461  –0.161  0.467  –0.135 
  (7.02)***  (6.58)***  (6.54)***  (4.91)*** 
Duration  0.044  –0.159  0.076  –0.137 
  (2.32)**  (32.47)***  (3.69)***  (22.80)*** 
Duration2  –0.222  0.397  –0.277  0.347 
  (3.07)***  (18.72)***  (3.73)***  (14.31)*** 
In Phase 1 pilot area  –0.191  –0.434  –0.152  –0.447 
  (1.54)  (12.79)***  (0.87)  (12.38)*** 
In Phase 2 pilot area  0.078  –0.178  0.138  –0.189 
  (0.73)  (7.49)***  (0.86)  (7.23)*** 
In Phase 3 pilot area  –0.336  –0.418  –0.305  –0.430 
  (2.88)***  (14.42)***  (1.88)*  (13.73)*** 
In Phase 4 pilot area  0.069  –0.113  0.119  –0.116 
  (0.67)  (5.05)***  (0.79)  (4.82)*** 
Quarter 2 dummy  0.194  –0.110  0.153  –0.097 
  (2.16)**  (4.45)***  (1.40)  (3.69)*** 
Quarter 3 dummy  0.317  0.124  0.331  0.125 
  (4.51)***  (7.10)***  (4.52)***  (7.14)*** 
Quarter 4 dummy  0.208  –0.164  0.180  –0.152  
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  No unobserved heterogeneity  Correlated unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Dependent variable:   Stops 
receiving 
welfare for 
work of 16 or 
more hours 
Stops receiving 
welfare for work 











work of fewer 
than 16 hours 
(including not 
working) 
  (2.53)**  (6.80)***  (1.80)*  (5.68)*** 
Unobserved heterogeneity mass 
points: 
     
Type 1  N/A  –4.807 
    (20.24)*** 
Type 2  N/A  –3.573 
    (20.91)*** 
Loading factor on unobserved 
heterogeneity component 




Proportion of lone parents of type 1  N/A  0.769 
Log likelihood  –283,820.62  –283,431.22 
Sample size  72,439  72,439 
Controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity 
No  Yes 
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.  Estimated coefficients are based on equations (1) 
and  (2)  in  the  text.    Estimates  in  „Correlated  unobserved  heterogeneity‟  columns  include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9).  
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 Table 6 Coefficient estimates for the transition from not receiving 
welfare to receiving welfare: baseline model 




Dependent variable:  Not receiving welfare to receiving welfare 
Constant  –3.004  0.066 
  (347.38)***  (0.14) 
Receiving IWC  –0.222  –0.160 
  (3.08)***  (2.11)** 
Number of children  –0.128  –0.133 
  (18.16)***  (17.88)*** 
Youngest child aged < 1  0.785  0.769 
  (21.55)***  (20.31)*** 
Youngest child aged 1–3  0.582  0.574 
  (25.25)***  (23.68)*** 
Youngest child aged 3–5  0.470  0.470 
  (19.60)***  (18.83)*** 
Youngest child aged 5–11  0.486  0.480 
  (24.55)***  (23.26)*** 
Time trend  –0.017  –0.014 
  (3.00)***  (2.40)** 
Time2  0.062  0.051 
  (3.48)***  (2.79)*** 
Duration  –0.227  –0.211 
  (46.21)***  (39.80)*** 
Duration2  0.611  0.567 
  (21.96)***  (19.90)*** 
In Phase 1 pilot area  –0.076  –0.092 
  (1.93)*  (2.23)** 
In Phase 2 pilot area  –0.020  –0.034 
  (0.89)  (1.45) 
In Phase 3 pilot area  –0.102  –0.123 
  (3.22)***  (3.67)*** 
In Phase 4 pilot area  –0.087  –0.092 
  (4.25)***  (4.25)*** 
Quarter 2 dummy  0.100  0.103 
  (5.09)***  (5.18)*** 
Quarter 3 dummy  0.018  0.022 
  (0.93)  (1.09) 
Quarter 4 dummy  –0.079  –0.078 
  (3.97)***  (3.90)*** 
Loading  factor  on  unobserved  heterogeneity 
component 
N/A  0.705 
(5.93)*** 
Log likelihood  –283,820.62  –283,431.22 
Sample size  72,439 
Controls for unobserved heterogeneity  No  Yes  
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Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.  Estimated coefficients are based on equations (1) 
and  (2)  in  the  text.    Estimates  in  „Correlated  unobserved  heterogeneity‟  columns  include 
unobserved heterogeneity terms as depicted in equation (9). 
Table 7 Estimated impact of IWC on potentially eligible lone parents in 






































  Estimates in ppts 
(standard errors given in 
parentheses) 
         
               
3  0.5  0.3    6.8  10.4  7.4  2.9 
  (0.112)***  (0.129)**            
6  1.0  0.7    11.8  12.0  8.5  5.8 
  (0.154)***  (0.151)***            
9  1.3  0.9    15.3  13.3  8.5  6.8 
  (0.187)***  (0.174)***            
12  1.6  1.0    18.2  14.3  8.8  7.0 
  (0.220)***  (0.199)***            
15  1.7  1.1    20.5  14.9  8.3  7.4 
  (0.260)***  (0.230)***            
18  1.7  1.3    22.5  15.6  7.6  8.3 
  (0.301)***  (0.265)***            
21  1.8  1.3    24.2  16.2  7.4  8.0 
  (0.348)***  (0.306)***            
24  2.0  1.4    25.9  16.7  7.7  8.4 
  (0.419)***  (0.366)***            
27  1.4  1.6    26.4  17.1  5.3  9.4 
  (0.539)**  (0.469)***            
30  1.2  0.4    27.3  16.6  4.8  2.4 
  (0.758)  (0.650)            
33  1.1  0.3    29.2  17.3  3.8  1.7 
  (1.014)  (0.856)           
               
Notes: The table reports the estimated impact of IWC based on various ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions on the flow sample (see Appendix B).  Sample sizes are shown in Appendix H.  Standard errors 
are given in parentheses.  * = significant at 10 per cent level; ** = significant at 5 per cent level; *** = 
significant at 1 per cent level.  Additionality rate is calculated as „100 × impact / outcome‟. 




Figure 1 budget constraint with and without IWC 
 
Note: assumes rents of £60 a week that are fully met by Housing Benefit when on 
welfare 
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Figure 2 Lone parents who leave welfare after claiming for at least 12 
months: proportion in work over time 
 
Note: Sample is all lone parents who left welfare after claiming for at least 12 months in pilot districts 
(66,523) and comparison districts (201,761) between when the pilots were introduced and 31 March 2006.   
 
Figure 3 IWC recipients: proportion in work over time 
 
Note: Sample is all lone parents who left welfare for IWC between when the pilots were introduced and 31 
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Figure 4 Simulated effect of IWC on proportion of lone parents off 
welfare: flow sample 
 
Notes: Base is those who become potentially eligible for IWC after the programme start date. 
Figure 5 Simulated outcomes for IWC recipients in the absence of IWC  
 
  
Notes: Actual percentages off welfare and on IWC calculated from the WPLS and IWC administrative 
data.  Simulations using results of baseline model described above.  Errors calibrated as described in this 
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Figure 6 Decomposing the additional impact of IWC on IWC recipients 
 
Notes: Based on model results reported in Appendix F with unobserved heterogeneity.  Errors calibrated 
as described in Appendix F.  Sample sizes reported in Appendix F. 
Figure 7 Impact of IWC on proportion of potentially eligible lone parents 
off welfare in different models 
  
Notes: Simulations using results of models described above without unobserved heterogeneity.  Errors 
calibrated as described in this section.   
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APPENDIX A. Details of the policies offered in the lone parent pilots 
This appendix lists the policies that together formed the lone parent pilots (LPPs).  It 
describes the situation that existed up until 31 March 2007.   
The specific policies are: 
  In-Work Credit (IWC); 
  Work Search Premium (WSP); 
  Extended Schools Childcare (ESC); 
  Quarterly Work-Focused Interviews (QWFIs) for lone parents in Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) in which an ESC pilot is operating, whose youngest child is aged 
12 or over (Extended Schools Quarterly Work-Focused Interviews, ESQWFIs); 
  New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP). 
The LPPs were rolled out in four phases (the names refer to the Jobcentre Plus districts; 
there are around 90 of these districts in Great Britain)  
  Phase 1 (April 2004): Bradford; North London; South-East London. 
  Phase  2  (October  2004):  Cardiff  &  Vale;  Central  London;  Dudley  &  Sandwell; 
Edinburgh, Lothian & Borders; Lancashire West; Leeds; Leicestershire; Staffordshire; 
West London. 
  Phase 3 (April 2005): Brent, Harrow & Hillingdon; City & East London; Lambeth, 
Southwark & Wandsworth; South London. 
  Phase 4 (October 2005): Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire; Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 
& Oxfordshire; Essex; Hampshire & the Isle of Wight; Kent; Surrey & Sussex. 
Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Tasters 
The Extended Schools Childcare and Childcare Taster pilots (jointly referred to as ESC) 
were introduced in several Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in Great Britain. They 
aimed to improve the availability of affordable childcare for working parents.  The pilot 
was intended to help primarily parents of school-age children (i.e. children aged 5 to 14, 
16 for children with special needs), but the LEAs‟ remit also allowed them to provide 
childcare for younger or older children if that would help lone parents into work.  In  
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addition, although this pilot was mainly aimed at helping lone parents who were ready to 
move into employment, in practice the services were available to all parents.   
Extended Schools Quarterly Work-Focused Interviews (ESQWFIs)  
In LEAs in which an ESC pilot was operating, there were mandatory Work-Focused 
Interviews (WFIs) at quarterly intervals for lone parents whose youngest child was aged 
12 or over, and who had been on IS/JSA for 12 months or more (ESQWFIs).  From 
October  2005,  mandatory  quarterly  review  meetings  were  required  of  lone  parents 
claiming welfare for 12 months or more and with a youngest child aged 14 or 15 years.  
Since April 2007, Quarterly Work-Focused Interviews (QWFIs) have been introduced in 
ND+fLP areas for lone parents with a youngest child aged 11–13. 
New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP) 
At the end of April 2005, five JCP districts started offering ND+fLP: Bradford, North 
London and South-East London (Phase 1) and Dudley & Sandwell and Leicestershire 
(Phase 2).  From October 2006, Cardiff & Vale and Edinburgh, Lothian & Borders also 
began  to  offer  ND+fLP  services  (although  these  districts  do  not  form  part  of  this 
report). The aim of ND+fLP was to offer a coherent package of support to lone parents, 
with the pilots bringing together the main themes of the Work Focus, Work Incentives 
and Childcare strategies, and building on the lessons learned from the Incapacity Benefit 
Pathway pilots.   
APPENDIX B. Details of the data-sets used 
We make use of administrative data on spells on welfare benefits, payments of IWC, and 
employment records. The data is known as the Work & Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS), and combines employment (or, more accurately, income tax) records from Her 
Majesty‟s Revenue & Customs, with a range of programme and benefit spells from the 
Department for Work & Pensions. Appendices A-C of Brewer et al (2007) describe the 
main steps in “cleaning” these datasets. The administrative data on time spent on welfare 
is based on the payments made by the government agency, and so should be reliable, but 
the employment data is less reliable: the employment records in the WPLS are based on 
employers‟  returns  to  the  UK  tax  authority  (HMRC)  about  individuals  they  are 
employing who are earning enough to be liable for income tax or national insurance (so-
called  P45  and  P46  returns).  This  means  that  the  resulting  dataset  may  not  include  
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individuals who are earning below the personal threshold (although the received wisdom 
is that many, mainly large, employers do report such spells of work), nor other spells of 
work that have not been declared to HMRC. For this reason, the data may underestimate 
the amount of time spent in work. On the other hand, the way in which uncertain start 
and end dates are recorded will lead to an overestimate of the amount of time spent in 
work if all dates in the WPLS are taken at face value. 
Because relatively little information about individual characteristics is available from the 
WPLS, it is a key feature of the evaluation that local area variables are merged into the 
final dataset. Some variables are included because they provide information about some 
aspect of the local labour market that is likely to affect whether lone parents are able to 
find work and/or leave welfare (for example, the local unemployment rate); others are 
included  to  proxy  for  certain  characteristics  (for  example,  highest  educational 
qualification)  that  are  unavailable  at  the  individual  level,  but  that  are  likely  to  be 
important  determinants  of  lone  parents‟  labour  market  outcomes.  This  is  done  by 
including  the  average  level  of  the  characteristic  for  all  individuals  living  in  a  small 
neighbourhood,  typically  Super  Output  Area  (SOA)  level,  comprising  approximately 
1,500  households.  These  variables  were  mapped  into  the  sample  of  welfare  claims 
(described below) on the basis of the individual‟s postcode at the time they first became 
potentially eligible for IWC. The data included: key Statistics from the 2001 UK Census, 
plus a bespoke tabulation, courtesy of the Office for National Statistics (Census); Ofsted 
data  on  registered  child-carers  in  England  (Ofsted);  the  2004  Index  of  Multiple 
Deprivation  (IMD)  containing  data  from  2002;  and  Travel-to-Work  Area  data  on 
unemployment and vacancy rates from NOMIS.  
 
 
 